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Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association 
14-915 
Ruling Below: Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188995 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 5, 2013) 
California law requires every teacher working in most of its public schools to financially 
contribute to the local teachers' union and that union's state and national affiliates in order to 
subsidize expenses the union claims are germane to collective bargaining. California law also 
requires public school teachers to subsidize expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining 
unless a teacher affirmatively objects and then renews his or her opposition in writing every year. 
The Plaintiff, Rebecca Friedrichs, a public school teacher in Orange County, California, objected 
to paying her “agency fee” union dues to the California Teachers Association (CTA) and filed 
suit. The District Court for the Central District of California ruled in favor of the CTA stating 
that the 1977 case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education requires that California teachers 
unaffiliated with the teacher’s union must nevertheless pay union dues. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed. 
Question Presented: (1) Whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education should be overruled and 
public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment; and (2) 
whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public employees affirmatively object to 
subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions, rather than requiring that employees 
affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech. 
 
Rebecca FRIEDRICHS, et al. 
v. 
CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, et al. 
 
United States District Court for the Central District of California 
Decided on December 5, 2013 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
I. Background 
Under California law, a union is allowed to 
become the exclusive bargaining 
representative for public school employees in 
a bargaining unit such as a public school 
district by submitting proof that a majority of 
employees in the unit wish to be represented 
by the union. Once a union becomes the 
exclusive bargaining representative within a 
district, it may establish an "agency-shop" 
arrangement with that district, whereby all 
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employees "shall, as a condition of continued 
employment, be required either to join the 
recognized employee organization or pay the 
fair share service fee." This "agency fee" is 
usually the same amount as the union dues.  
California law limits the use of agency fees 
to activities "germane" to collective 
bargaining. Each year, unions must estimate 
the portion of expenses that do not fall into 
this category for the coming year, based on 
the non-chargeable portion of a recent year's 
fee. After the union has made this 
determination, it must send a notice to all 
non-members setting forth both the agency 
fee and the non-chargeable portions of the 
fee. If non-members do not wish to pay the 
non-chargeable portions of the fee—i.e., the 
portions of the fee going to activities not 
"germane" to collective bargaining—they 
must notify the union after receipt of the 
notice. Non-members who provide this 
notification receive a rebate or fee-reduction 
for that year.  
Plaintiffs are (1) public school teachers who 
have resigned their union membership and 
object to paying the non-chargeable portion 
of their agency fee each year, and (2) the 
Christian Educators Association 
International, a non-profit religious 
organization "specifically serving Christians 
working in public schools." Defendants are 
(1) local unions for the districts in which the 
individual plaintiffs are employed as teachers 
and the superintendents of those local unions, 
(2) the National Education Association, and 
(3) the California Teachers Association.  
Plaintiffs claim that "[b]y requiring Plaintiffs 
to make any financial contributions in 
support of any union, California's 
agency shop arrangement violates their rights 
to free speech and association under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution," and that "[b]y requiring 
Plaintiffs to undergo 'opt out' procedures to 
avoid making financial contributions in 
support of 'non-chargeable' union 
expenditures, California's agency-shop 
arrangement violates their rights to free 
speech and association under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution." 
Plaintiffs move for judgment on the 
pleadings, but in Defendants' favor. Although 
Plaintiffs are not clear on whether they are 
asking the Court to grant or deny their 
Motion, Plaintiffs are clear that they are 
asking the Court to enter judgment in favor of 
Defendants. Accordingly, the Court 
construes the Motion such that granting the 
Motion would allow judgment to be entered 
and submitted in favor of Defendants. 
 
II. Legal Standard 
"After the pleadings are closed—but early 
enough not to delay trial—a party may move 
for judgment on the pleadings." Motions for 
judgment on the pleadings are governed by 
the same standards applicable to Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. The Court "must 
accept all factual allegations in the complaint 
as true and construe them in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party." 
"Judgment on the pleadings is proper when 
the moving party clearly establishes on the 
face of the pleadings that no material issue of 
fact remains to be resolved and that it is 
entitled to judgement as a matter of law.” 
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III. Discussion 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to enter judgment on 
the pleadings in favor of Defendants, 
contending that Plaintiffs' claims are 
"presently foreclosed by” Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education and Mitchell v. Los 
Angeles Unified School District. In Abood the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutional 
validity of compelling employees to support 
a particular collective bargaining 
representative and rejected the notion that the 
only funds from nonunion members that a 
union constitutionally could use for political 
or ideological causes were those funds that 
the nonunion members affirmatively 
consented to pay. The Mitchell court, 
following Abood, held that the First 
Amendment did not require an "opt in" 
procedure for nonunion members to pay fees 
equal to the full amount of union dues under 
an agency shop arrangement. The parties do 
not dispute that Abood and Mitchell foreclose 
Plaintiffs' claims, and the Court agrees that 
these decisions are controlling. Accordingly, 
the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion and enters 
judgment on the pleadings in favor of 
Defendants. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
is VACATED as moot. 
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“Supreme Court Takes up Major Case on Public Sector Union 
Fees” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
June 30, 2015 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed 
to take up a case that could weaken public 
sector unions, a challenge by 10 nonunion 
public school teachers who say California's 
requirement that they pay the equivalent of 
union dues violates their free speech rights. 
The teachers have asked the court to upend a 
decades-old practice allowing public-sector 
unions to collect fees from workers who do 
not want union representation so long as the 
money is not spent on political activities. 
The case comes as some Republican 
politicians, most notably Wisconsin 
Governor Scott Walker, have taken aim at 
public and private sector unions, which 
generally align themselves with Democrats. 
In 2011, Walker signed a law that limited 
collective bargaining rights for state workers. 
Walker, a likely 2016 presidential candidate, 
then prevailed in a union-backed 2012 recall 
election. 
Unions, including the California Teachers 
Association, had urged the court not to hear 
the case, as did California Attorney General 
Kamala Harris, a Democrat. 
"We are disappointed that ... the Supreme 
Court has chosen to take a case that threatens 
the fundamental promise of America - that if 
you work hard and play by the rules you 
should be able to provide for your family and 
live a decent life," the unions said in a 
statement. 
The case targeting various teachers' unions 
offers the justices a chance to overturn a 
significant labor law precedent from 1977. In 
the case Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education, the high court held that such 
payments to unions by nonmembers did not 
violate the U.S. Constitution's First 
Amendment free-speech guarantee because 
nonmembers otherwise would benefit from 
collective bargaining at no cost. 
Members of the Supreme Court's 
conservative wing, including Justice Samuel 
Alito, have criticized the precedent. 
The case could affect 7 million public-sector 
employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements in more than 20 states, according 
to the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank 
that filed a brief urging the court to hear the 
case. 
'DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES' 
The Center for Individual Rights, the 
nonprofit law firm representing the plaintiffs, 
welcomed the court taking the case. 
"This case is about the right of individuals to 
decide for themselves whether to join and pay 
dues to an organization that purports to speak 
on their behalf. We are seeking the end of 
compulsory union dues across the nation on 
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the basis of the free speech rights guaranteed 
by the First Amendment," said Terry Pell, the 
group's president. 
Under California's "agency-shop" system, 
public school teachers who do not join the 
union must pay a fee equal to union dues. 
Nonmembers can then seek a refund of the 
portion the union spent on lobbying and 
activities unrelated to collective bargaining 
or contract administration. 
The conservative-leaning Supreme Court has 
signaled dissatisfaction with the Abood 
ruling. 
In a 5-4 ruling in a 2012 case, Alito said 
Abood and subsequent cases "have 
substantially impinged upon the First 
Amendment rights of non-members" of 
public-sector unions. 
Last year, the court declined to extend the 
Abood precedent to Illinois home-health 
workers. The 5-4 ruling stated that state-paid, 
in-home care workers cannot be compelled to 
pay union dues, but the court stopped short of 
blocking organized labor from collecting 
such fees from other public employees. 
The 10 teachers, including lead plaintiff 
Rebecca Friedrichs, sued the unions in 2013 
saying the "agency-shop" system violated 
their free speech rights. The teachers 
appealed to the Supreme Court after the 9th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor 
of the unions in November 2014. 
The court will hear arguments and issue a 
ruling in its next term, which starts in October 
and ends in June 2016. 
The case is Friedrichs et al, v. California 
Teachers Association, et al, U.S. Supreme 
Court, No. 14-915.
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“Supreme Court Ruling Could Give Strength to Teacher Suit” 
U.S. News & World Report 
Allie Bidwell 
July 1, 2014 
 
While a narrow Supreme Court ruling 
directly impacted just a relative handful of 
people, it elicited an outcry of a perceived 
war against workers and cast doubt on a long-
standing precedent that could have troubling 
implications for teachers unions down the 
road. 
 
In Harris v. Quinn, the court ruled 5-4 that 
Illinois could not force eight part-time home 
health care workers to contribute to union 
bargaining fees, and that doing so would be a 
violation of their First Amendment rights. 
Part of the issue hinged on how broadly a 
1977 case on forced union dues extends. That 
case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 
allows unions to require nonmembers to pay 
fees for collective bargaining, as long as the 
dues are not used for ideological or political 
purposes. 
 
In the end, the justices refused to extend the 
precedent to the situation in Illinois, claiming 
the health care workers are "quite different 
from full-fledged public employees." But in 
the majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito 
said the analysis that led to a decision in 
Abood is "questionable on several grounds." 
Collective bargaining issues, he wrote, are 
inherently political in the public sector. 
 
"In the private sector, the line is easier to see. 
Collective bargaining concerns the union’s 
dealings with the employer; political 
advocacy and lobbying are directed at the 
government," Alito wrote. "But in the public 
sector, both collective bargaining and 
political advocacy and lobbying are directed 
at the government." 
 
That sort of questioning previews the debates 
likely to take place in a wider-ranging case 
(Friedrichs v. California Teachers 
Association), in which a group of teachers is 
challenging several California teachers 
unions on the grounds that state laws 
requiring public employees to pay union dues 
– regardless of whether they support the 
union – are unconstitutional. The case, first 
filed in April 2013 and now before the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, seeks 
to overturn the 1977 Abood ruling. 
 
Terry Pell, president of the Center for 
Individual Rights, which is representing the 
10 California teachers, tells U.S. News his 
organization plans to petition the circuit court 
"in a few days" for expedited consideration 
so the case can move to the Supreme Court. 
The group could get a decision from the 
appellate court "certainly by the end of the 
year" and a possible hearing from the 
Supreme Court in the next term, Pell says. 
 
"We’re not attacking collective bargaining. 
… That’s not at issue," Pell says. "All we’re 
saying is individual teachers get to decide 
whether to pay dues to that organization. You 
can have collective bargaining and you can 
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have a strong union, but you don’t have to 
have compulsory dues." 
 
California teachers union dues can cost as 
much as $1,000 annually, according to the 
plaintiffs. While nonmember teachers can 
choose to opt out of the 30 to 40 percent of 
the dues explicitly devoted to lobbying, they 
must pay the remaining hundreds devoted to 
collective bargaining. 
 
"Surely the state's interest in preventing 'free-
riding' is diminished when the cost of the ride 
far exceeds its benefits," the Center for 
Individual Rights said in a brief submitted in 
the Supreme Court's Harris case. 
 
Pell says the California case raises a broader 
question of forced compulsory dues and that 
the new Supreme Court decision makes it 
likely the justices would rule against unions. 
 
"We're quite optimistic and hopeful that 
when our case gets to the court, we'll get a 
landmark decision," Pell says. "That would 
be huge." 
 
If the precedent were to be overturned in the 
Supreme Court, it would be a big change for 
public unions, says Michael Brickman, 
national policy director for the Thomas B. 
Fordham Institute. Public employee unions, 
he says, rely on mandates that workers will 
join the union, or at least pay into "the coffers 
of the union, whether they want to or not." 
 
"You've seen in some states where there’s 
been a removal or change to this mandate that 
a significant percentage of public workers 
don’t want to join the union and would rather 
represent themselves," Brickman says. "It 
will be certainly a case that both public 
employee unions and advocates for freedom 
for employees will be watching very closely." 
 
After Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker signed 
legislation in 2011 that limited collective 
bargaining, prohibited employers from 
collecting union dues and did not require 
members to pay dues, two major teachers 
unions in the state lost thousands of their 
members. The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel 
reported the Wisconsin Education 
Association Council, a National Education 
Association (NEA) affiliate, had lost about 
one-third of its 98,000 members, and 
membership in the American Federation of 
Teachers' (AFT) Wisconsin affiliate 
decreased by 60 percent from its peak of 
16,000 members. 
 
Michigan and Indiana have passed similar 
laws limiting fee collection by public labor 
unions. 
 
Teachers unions see compulsory fee 
collection as an issue of fairness: Whether 
nonunion members should "reap the wages, 
benefits and protections negotiated in a 
collectively bargained contract without 
needing to pay their fair share," as the 
California Teachers Association put it in a 
statement following the Harris ruling. 
 
"Agency fees are a common-sense, 
straightforward way to ensure fairness and 
protect equity and individual rights," NEA 
President Dennis Van Roekel said in a 
statement. "Every educator who enjoys the 
benefits and protections of a negotiated 
 9 
contract should, in fairness, contribute to 
maintaining the contract." 
 
But it's not the first time the Abood precedent 
has been challenged. In a 2012 Supreme 
Court case, the justices ruled that unions' 
anti-free-riding argument would be 
"generally insufficient to overcome First 
Amendment objections." 
 
Both national teachers unions – the NEA and 
the AFT – still pledged to continue their 
efforts following the Monday ruling. In a 
video message provided to Blue Nation 
Review, AFT President Randi Weingarten 
said the Supreme Court decision would 
"embolden" the union. 
 
The Illinois AFT affiliate said the Monday 
ruling should make members "fight harder." 
 
"Union members understand that what harms 
one of us harms us all," the group said in a 
statement. "It is more important than ever 
before that we organize in our workplaces to 
push back against these corporate attacks and 
fight for our ability to stand up for our 
schools and our communities. By 
strengthening our unions, we will ensure our 
voice is heard." 
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 “The End of Public-Employee Unions?” 
The Atlantic 
Garrett Epps 
February 20, 2015 
 
Constitutional scholars sometimes like to 
commend courts for what they call “the 
passive virtues”—a reluctance to become 
involved in constitutional dispute, a reticence 
to announce new rules, a preference for 
standing by earlier decisions (“stare 
decisis”). 
 
Judges, too, like to cite what they call “the 
canon of constitutional avoidance,” a set of 
rules designed to avoid unnecessary 
constitutional decisions. In Federalist 78, 
Alexander Hamilton promised that the new 
union’s courts would have “have neither 
force nor will, but merely judgment.” 
 
The truth is that since at least Marbury v. 
Madison, Courts and Justices have hinted, 
signaled, begged, and reached out to litigants 
to bring them issues where one or more 
justice thinks the law needs to change. On the 
current Court, few of the Justices have 
signaled quite as vigorously as Justice 
Samuel Alito. Alito, a man of firm likes and 
dislikes, has twice questioned the 
constitutionality of public-employee 
contracts. Neither case, however, presented 
the chance to invalidate them. 
 
Now his moment may have come. In 
response to Alito’s hints, the issue has landed 
squarely in the Court’s inbox in the form of a 
petition for review in a suit against the 
California Teachers Association. If Alito gets 
his desired result, it will deal a long-lasting 
blow to union power—and, perhaps by 
coincidence, the Democratic Party. 
 
Here’s the issue: Even in union states, public 
employees cannot be required to join a union. 
Such a requirement, the Court has said, 
would violate their First Amendment rights, 
because that would be the government 
requiring them to speak and associate against 
their will. However, state governments can 
sign agreements with unions designating the 
union as the official bargaining agent for all 
employees, members or not. The union then 
must represent both members and non-
members—and representation costs money, 
in the form of lawyers, economists, 
researchers, and so forth. Non-members are 
thus potentially “free riders” who get a 
service paid for by their fellow workers. 
 
In response, a compromise developed called 
the “agency-fee” or “fair-share” payment. 
Requiring objectors to pay for political 
activities or lobbying would be “compelled 
political speech,” and violate the First 
Amendment. However, under the “fair share” 
system, non-members are charged a fee that 
excludes these political activities and is 
designated to cover only the chargeable costs 
of actual representation—negotiating 
contracts, administering benefit programs, 
and helping employees with grievances. 
 
The “fair share” fee is Alito’s current target. 
In a 1977 case called Abood v. Detroit Board 
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of Education, the Burger Court said the fees 
do not violate the First Amendment: “Public 
employees are not basically different from 
private employees,” the Court said. “[O]n the 
whole, they have the same sort of skills, the 
same needs, and seek the same advantages.” 
The subjects of collective bargaining are the 
same in either case. Wages and working 
conditions in the public sector have a political 
quality, but in their essence were more like 
the issues that private employers and their 
workers must negotiate. A state could decide 
that “exclusive representation” would make 
for a more orderly workplace; it could also 
decide to disallow “free riders.” Neither 
decision violated the First Amendment. “A 
public employee who believes that a union 
representing him is urging a course that is 
unwise as a matter of public policy is not 
barred from expressing his viewpoint,” the 
Court said. “Besides voting in accordance 
with his convictions, every public employee 
is largely free to express his views, in public 
or private orally or in writing.” 
 
Abood has become the basis for scores of 
public-employee contracts, and the Court has 
reaffirmed it at least four times over the past 
30 years. But in 2011, a group of service 
workers in California challenged a union 
“special assessment” designed to fund an 
emergency campaign against certain anti-
union measures proposed by then-Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger. The case was 
decided within the Abood framework; but in 
his majority opinion, Alito signaled his 
dislike of the entire line of cases. “[F]ree-
rider arguments ... are generally insufficient 
to overcome First Amendment objections,” 
he wrote. Agency fee agreements thus 
represent a First Amendment “anomaly—one 
that we have found to be justified by the 
interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’ But it is 
an anomaly nevertheless.” 
 
Anti-union groups hastened to explore this 
possible opening, and in the 2014 case of 
Harris v. Quinn, the Court faced a new 
challenge to “fair-share” payments by a 
group of home-health workers funded by a 
federal-state program. Though the workers 
were hired and supervised by the clients 
whose homes they worked in, the Illinois 
legislature voted to allow them to vote for a 
bargaining agent, and they chose the Service 
Employees International Union. Plaintiffs 
objected to the fees, and asked the Court to 
overturn Abood once and for all. In the end, 
however, the majority chose not to overturn 
Abood; instead, it reasoned that the home-
health care workers were not “full-fledged” 
state employees, and thus the state had no 
need for “labor peace,” as it might at a school 
or a government office. 
 
But beyond that, Alito’s majority opinion 
suggested that a majority was sick and tired 
of this Abood nonsense, and might be grateful 
if someone—anyone—would bring them a 
case that would drive a stake through its 
heart. The essence of the argument is that all 
expenses of public-employee bargaining are 
“political,” because public-employee 
benefits, salaries, and pensions are paid for 
by taxpayers. Thus there is no “ordinary” 
collective bargaining, and financing any 
union dealings with government—even, say, 
a message saying, “Our union member X was 
discharged in violation of the contract”—is 
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forcing objectors to pay for “ideological 
speech.” 
 
In a sharp dissent, Justice Elena Kagan 
warned that “[t]he Abood rule is deeply 
entrenched, and is the foundation for not tens 
or hundreds, but thousands of contracts 
between unions and governments across the 
Nation. Our precedent about precedent, fairly 
understood and applied, makes it impossible 
for this Court to reverse that decision.” 
 
Nonetheless, a hopeful anti-union group—
the Center for Individual Rights, represented 
by right-wing powerhouse lawyer Michael 
Carvin—is pressing another opportunity 
upon the Court. “This case is an excellent 
vehicle for reconsidering Abood,” the cert 
petition notes; indeed so, because public-
school teachers are unquestionably “full-
fledged” state employees, and the petitioners 
can’t win if Abood is good law. 
 
This issue has an overwhelmingly partisan 
valence. For good or ill, public-employee 
unions are part of the base of the Democratic 
Party, and Justice Alito has made very clear 
that he sees the “fair-share” issue through a 
partisan lens. (At oral argument in Harris, he 
interrupted the Solicitor General’s argument 
to suggest that what was really going on here 
was a crude Democratic power play: “I 
thought the situation was that Governor 
Blagojevich got a huge campaign 
contribution from the union and virtually, as 
soon as he got into office, he took out his pen 
and signed an executive order that had the 
effect of putting—what was it, $3.6 million 
into the union coffers?”) An end to fair-share 
payments will mean a reduction in the 
strength of the unions, both in collective 
bargaining and as political actors. Many 
present members will continue to join the 
union even without the “fair share” 
payments. As new workers enter the 
workforce, though, many will make a cold 
judgment: Why should I pay the union to do 
something for me it’s obligated to do 
anyway?  Alito’s opinion in Harris suggested 
that if unions are so all-fired great, employees 
will pay without being required to; Kagan 
tartly asked, “Does the majority think that 
public employees are immune from basic 
principles of economics?” If those laws 
apply, union membership will drop. 
 
The Roberts Court does not always reach 
conservative results; but when the two parties 
have dogs in a fight, the majority finds itself 
mightily tempted to find that the GOP’s 
preferred outcome is also the law. 
Overturning Abood would, as Kagan noted, 
be a radical step. The temptation must be 
great, and even if the Court declines this 
chance, others will come. 
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“Why an Upcoming Supreme Court Case Has Teachers Unions 
Feeling Very, Very Nervous” 
Slate 
Laura Moser 
July 8, 2015 
 
Late last month, the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear a case that could deliver a fatal blow to 
the financial health of already-imperiled 
public-employee unions. In Friedrichs v. 
California Teachers Association, Rebecca 
Friedrichs, a public school teacher in Orange 
County, along with nine other teachers and 
the Christian Educators Association, filed a 
suit objecting to the agency, or “fair share,” 
fees they’re required to pay to the CTA. 
 
As it currently stands, California teachers 
cannot be forced to join the CTA, which the 
Supreme Court has ruled would violate the 
freedom of association guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. But even those teachers 
who decline union membership must still pay 
a fee to cover the cost of “collective 
bargaining, contract administration, and 
grievance adjustment purposes,” a 
compromise established in 1977 by a 
unanimous Supreme Court ruling in the 
similar-looking Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education. 
 
The idea is that because all public employees 
benefit from their union’s negotiations for, 
say, higher wages and better working 
conditions, they should all pay for it, 
regardless of how they feel about the union 
philosophically or politically. The non-union 
teachers still pay “forced dues” of about 
$850, or two-thirds the cost of a full union 
membership. The other third goes to the 
lobbying arm of the union, which tends to 
favor Democratic candidates 
overwhelmingly. 
 
Over the past few years, Justice Samuel Alito 
has strongly signaled that he’d like to see 
Abood overturned, and the right-wing Center 
for Individual Rights seems to have hand-
crafted this latest case to his specifications. 
The problem with forced dues, the CIR 
argues, is that you can’t so cleanly separate 
the overt political lobbying from the union’s 
other functions: 
 
Requiring teachers to pay these 
“agency fees” assumes that collective 
bargaining is non-political.  But 
bargaining with local governments is 
inherently political.  Whether the 
union is negotiating for specific class 
sizes or pressing a local government 
to spend tax dollars on teacher 
pensions rather than on building 
parks, the union’s negotiating 
positions embody political choices 
that are often controversial. 
 
Friedrichs and her co-plaintiffs—represented 
by the same lawyer who brought the most 
recent challenge to Obamacare—are arguing 
that the fair-share requirement is a violation 
of their First Amendment rights, since they’re 
being forced to fund causes they may not 
support, everything from tenure protections 
to gun control. (A side issue is that the small 
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minority of nonmembers—in California, less 
than 10 percent of the state’s roughly 300,000 
teachers—miss out on some major frills, like 
life and disability insurance and a vote in 
union elections.) 
 
So what’s at stake here for education? If the 
court finds that teachers no longer have to pay 
the fair-share fees, as many worried unions 
fear that it will, the union (and other public-
sector unions like it all over the country) will 
lose a great deal of its negotiating leverage 
and potentially wither into insignificance, 
especially since many current union members 
may decide to stop paying dues. After all, the 
cost difference between a full membership 
and a fair-share fee is relatively minor, and 
the difference between a full membership and 
zero is not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the court sides with the plaintiffs, 
California will become a right-to-work state 
for teachers. That usually translates to 
diminished job security, fewer benefits, and 
lower wages. Forty-three kids in your 
second-grade classroom? Too bad. Out of 
school supplies and it’s only October? Buy 
them yourself. 
 
It’s Scott Walker’s version of manifest 
destiny, basically. 
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“High Court May Deal Unions Serious Blow” 
Politico 
Brian Mahoney 
June 30, 2015 
The Supreme Court will have an opportunity 
next term to deal public sector unions a 
serious financial blow. 
The court agreed Tuesday to hear Friedrichs 
v. California Teachers Association, a case 
brought by 10 non-union California teachers 
who say that forcing them to pay “fair share 
fees” to a union — even if only for the 
purpose of collective bargaining — compels 
them to support an organization they oppose 
politically, in violation of their free speech 
rights. 
The case is a blockbuster for both the court 
and the labor movement. Just days after the 
Supreme Court cheered unions and the rest of 
the liberal coalition by sanctioning gay 
marriage and the Affordable Care Act, the 
court chose to reconsider a privilege that 
public sector unions have enjoyed as a matter 
of settled law for four decades. The result 
may undermine drastically that same 
coalition. 
An adverse ruling in Friedrichs could in 
effect require public unions to operate in all 
50 states as they do in 25 so-called right-to-
work states that forbid unions from collecting 
dues or their equivalent from non-members, 
even as those unions bargain collectively for 
members and non-members alike. 
“We strongly support right-to-work,” James 
Sherk, a fellow at the conservative Heritage 
Foundation, said Tuesday. “We believe that 
workers ought to decide how to spend their 
money, and they ought not be forced to 
financially support interest groups whose 
agenda they don’t support or, even if they do 
support it, if they’d rather spend their money 
on their own family or their other needs, we 
strongly support that.” 
Public sector unions for workers like 
teachers, firemen, and police are among the 
strongest labor organizations in the country, 
having grown in recent decades even as 
membership in private-sector unions 
dwindled. Although the percentage of private 
sector employees who belong to unions is 
now a somewhat pitiful 6 percent — down 
from a historic high of nearly 40 percent in 
the early 1950s — the proportion of public 
sector workers who belong to unions is a 
robust 35.7 percent, according to 2014 
statistics released by the Labor Department in 
January. Powerful public employee unions 
like the National Education Association and 
the American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees spend millions of 
dollars on political campaigns each cycle. 
California is not a right-to-work state, which 
means that under current law public 
employees who choose not to join a union 
must pay fair share fees to cover collective 
bargaining costs. Since those non-members 
will benefit from whatever contract the union 
negotiates, labor groups and Democrats 
argue, they must pay fees to avoid becoming 
economic free riders. That presumption is 
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shared by the National Labor Relations Act, 
except in instances when individual states opt 
to go right-to-work. 
It’s hard to quantify the amount of union 
money potentially at risk. The three-million-
member NEA has about 90,000 non-
members who pay so-called agency fees for 
bargaining costs, according to the union’s 
2014 Labor Department disclosure. Losing 
those 90,000 wouldn’t crush the union. But a 
decision freeing members from paying dues 
could tempt many others to leave it. 
Public sector unions feared this day. Twice, 
Associate Justice Samuel Alito has stated in 
opinions of recent years that Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Ed., the 1977 case that established 
the constitutionality of fair share fees, was 
shaky. In a 2014 opinion in Harris v. Quinn, 
Alito said that precedent was “questionable 
on several grounds.” 
“Overturning Abood would be a huge setback 
for organized labor,” said Richard 
Kahlenberg of the liberal Century 
Foundation. “I think this is a way to try to 
crush the remaining small vibrant element of 
the trade union movement.” 
Abood allowed unions to charge such fair-
share fees “insofar as the service charges are 
applied to collective-bargaining, contract 
administration and grievance-adjustment 
purposes.” But the plaintiffs in Friedrichs 
argue that collective bargaining itself is 
inherently political. “Public sector bargaining 
is core political speech materially 
indistinguishable from lobbying,” their 
petition to the court said. 
“This case is about the right of individuals to 
decide for themselves whether to join and pay 
dues to an organization that purports to speak 
on their behalf,” the conservative Center for 
Individual Rights, which is representing the 
plaintiffs, said in a statement Tuesday. “We 
are seeking the end of compulsory union dues 
across the nation on the basis of the free 
speech rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.” 
NEA President Lily Eskelsen García, AFT 
President Randi Weingarten, CTA President 
Eric C. Heins, AFSCME President Lee 
Saunders and SEIU President Mary Kay 
Henry issued a joint statement condemning 
the court’s consideration of the case. 
“We are disappointed that at a time when big 
corporations and the wealthy few are 
rewriting the rules in their favor, knocking 
American families and our entire economy 
off-balance, the Supreme Court has chosen to 
take a case that threatens the fundamental 
promise of America — that if you work hard 
and play by the rules you should be able to 
provide for your family and live a decent 
life,” they said. 
The case will likely cause acrimony within a 
Supreme Court already sharply divided by 
recent rulings. In a dissent in last year’s 
Harris v. Quinn decision, Associate Justice 
Elena Kagan said she was pleased the court 
had not agreed to overrule Abood, calling 
such a step a “radical request.” 
Kagan said the court was smart to let the 
democratic process play out in the states. ”All 
across the country and continuing to the 
present day, citizens have engaged in 
passionate argument about the issue and have 
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made disparate policy choices,” she said. 
“The petitioners in this case asked this Court 
to end that discussion for the entire public 
sector, by overruling Abood and thus 
imposing a right-to-work regime for all 
government employees.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But it’s clear the court disagrees on just what 
issues it should let the states and citizens 
decide. Kagan’s language in her dissent last 
year was similar to that offered by Chief 
Justice John Roberts in last week’s gay 
marriage case. “Supporters of same-sex 
marriage have achieved considerable success 
persuading their fellow citizens — through 
the democratic process — to adopt their 
view,” Roberts said. “That ends today.” 
